an unsuccessful senatorial candidate against Douglas was not one to inspire
confidence in his abilities. Even the leaders of the Republican party had
little acquaintance with the new President.
Almost at the outset, Lincoln demonstrated that he was a poor
administrator. Accustomed, as his law partner William H. Herndon said, to
filing legal papers in his top hat, Lincoln conducted the administration of
the national govern ment in the same fashion. Selecting for his cabinet
spokesmen of the diverse elements that constituted the Republican party, he
surrounded himself with men of such conflicting views that he could not
rely on them to work together. Cabinet sessions rarely dealt with serious
issues. Usually, Lincoln permitted cabinet officers free rein in running
their departments.
Nor was Lincoln an effective leader of his party in the Congress, where
after secession the Republicans had overwhelming majorities. Long a Whig,
vigilant against executive "usurpation," he earnestly felt that as
president he ought not to exert even "indirect influence to affect the
action of congress." In consequence there was poor rapport between Capitol
Hill and the WHITE HOUSE. Even those measures that the President earnestly
advocated were weakened or defeated by members of his own party. But on
important issues relating to the conduct of the war and the restoration of
the Union, Lincoln followed his own counsel, ignoring the opinions of
Congress.
More than counterbalancing these deficiencies, however, were Lincoln's
strengths. Foremost was his unflinching dedication to the preservation of
the Union. Convinced that the United States was more than an ordinary
nation, that it was a proving ground for the idea of democratic government,
Lincoln felt that he was leading a struggle to preserve "the last, best
hope of earth." Despite war-weariness and repeated defeats, he never
wavered in his "paramount object." To restore national unity he would do
what was necessary, without regard to legalistic construction of the
CONSTITUTION, political objections in Congress, or personal popularity.
Partly because of that single-minded dedication, the American people, in
time, gave to Lincoln a loyalty that proved to be another of his great
assets. Making himself accessible to all who went to the White House,
Lincoln learned what ordinary citizens felt about their government. In
turn, his availability helped create in the popular mind the stereotype of
"Honest Abe," the people's president, straightforward, and sympathetic.
Lincoln's mastery of rhetoric further endeared him to the public. In an age
of pretentious orators, he wrote clearly and succinctly. Purists might
object when he said that the Confederates in one engagement "turned tail
and ran," but the man in the street approved. Lincoln's 268-word address at
the dedication of the national cemetery at Gettysburg meant more than the
preceding two-hour oration by Edward Everett.
Another of Lincoln's assets was the fact that he was a genius at the game
of politics. He astutely managed the patronage at his disposal,
distributing favors so as to bind local politicians to his administration
and to undermine potential rivals for the presidency. He understood the
value of silence and secrecy in politics and refrained from creating
divisive issues or causing needless confrontations. He was extraordinarily
flexible and pragmatic in the means he employed to restore the Union. "My
policy," he frequently said, "is to have no policy." That did not mean that
his was a course of drift. Instead, it reflected his understanding that, as
president, he could only handle problems as they arose, confident that
popular support for his solutions would be forthcoming.
Lincoln believed that the ultimate decision in the Civil War was beyond
his, or any other man's, control. "Now, at the end of three years
struggle," he wrote, as the war reached its climax, "the nation's condition
is not what either party, or any man, devised or expected. God alone can
claim it."
Sumter Crisis
In 1861, Lincoln's weaknesses were more evident than his strengths.
Immediately after his inauguration he faced a crisis over Fort Sumter in
the Charleston (S. C.) harbor, one of the few remaining U.S. forts in the
seceded states still under federal control. Informed that the troops would
have to be supplied or withdrawn, the inexperienced President anxiously
explored solutions. Withdrawal would appear a cowardly backdown, but
reinforcing the fort might precipitate hostilities. Lincoln painfully
concluded that he would send supplies to Sumter and let the Confederates
decide whether to fire on the flag of the Union. Historians differ as to
whether Lincoln anticipated that hostilities would follow his decision, but
they agree that Lincoln was determined that he would not order the first
shot fired. Informed of the approach of the federal supply fleet,
Confederate authorities at Charleston during the early hours of April 12
decided to bombard the fort. Thus, the Civil War began.
Because Congress was not in session, Lincoln moved swiftly to mobilize the
Union by executive order. His requisition to the states for 75,000
volunteers precipitated the secession of Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Arkansas. Kentucky tried to adopt an official policy of
"neutrality," while secession sentiment in Maryland was so strong that for
a time Washington, D.C., was cut off from communication with the North. In
order to restore order, Lincoln directed that the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus be suspended, at first along the line between Washington and
Philadelphia and later throughout most of the North, so that known
secessionists and persons suspected of disloyalty could be held without
trial. At the same time the President, without congressional authorization--
and thus in direct violation of the Constitution--ordered an increase in
the size of the regular Army and Navy. Doubting the loyalty of certain
government officials, he also entrusted public funds to private agents in
New York to purchase arms and supplies.
When the 37th Congress assembled in special session on July 4, 1861, it was
thus confronted with a fait accompli. The President, acting in his capacity
as commander in chief, had put himself at the head of the whole Union war
effort, arrogating to himself greater powers than those claimed by any
previous American president. His enemies termed him a dictator and a
tyrant. In fact, his power was limited, partly by his own instincts, partly
by the knowledge that his actions would be judged in four years at the
polls, and chiefly by the inadequacy of the federal bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, the role of Congress was sharply defined: it could
appropriate money to support the war, it could initiate legislation on
issues not related to the war, it could debate questions relating to the
conflict. But direction of the Union war effort was to remain firmly in
Lincoln's hands.
Military Policy
The first responsibility of the President was the successful
prosecution of the war against the Confederate States. In this duty he was
hampered by the lack of a strong military tradition in America and by the
shortage of trained officers. During the early months of the conflict the
War Department was headed by Simon Cameron, and corruption and inefficiency
were rife. Not until January, 1862, when Lincoln replaced Cameron with the
imperious but efficient Edwin M. Stanton, was some semblance of order
brought to the procurement of supplies for the federal armies. Navy
secretary Gideon Welles was above suspicion, but he was inexperienced in
nautical affairs and cautious in accepting innovations, such as the
ironclad monitors.
Even more difficult was the task of finding capable general officers. At
first the President gave supreme command of the Union forces to the elderly
Gen. Winfield Scott. After the Confederate victory at the first battle of
Bull Run (July 21, 1861), Lincoln increasingly entrusted power to George B.
McClellan, a brilliant organizer and administrator. But McClellan's
caution, his secretiveness, and his willingness to strip the defenses of
Washington the better to attack Richmond led Lincoln to look elsewhere for
military advice. Borrowing "a large number of strategical works" from the
Library of Congress, he attempted to direct the overall conduct of the war
himself by issuing a series of presidential general war orders. Gen. Henry
W. Halleck, whom Lincoln brought to Washington as a strategic planner,
served more as a glorified clerk, and the President repeatedly exercised
personal supervision over the commanders in the field.
Not until the emergence of Ulysses S. GRANT, hero of Vicksburg and
Chattanooga, did Lincoln find a general to whom he could entrust overall
direction of the war. Even then, the President kept a close eye on military
operations, advising and even occasionally overruling the general, but
mostly supporting and encouraging him.
Emancipation
Strongly opposed to slavery, Lincoln made a sharp distinction between
his personal views and his public responsibilities. He had been elected on
a platform that pledged not to interfere with the "peculiar institution" in
states where it already existed and had sworn to uphold a Constitution that
protected Southern rights. From the first day of the war, however, he was
under pressure from the more extreme antislavery men in his own party to
strike at slavery as the mainspring of the rebellion. Counterbalancing this
pressure was the need to conciliate opinion in the border states, which
still recognized slavery but were loyal to the Union. Any move against
slavery, Lincoln feared, would cause their secession.
Wartime pressure inescapably forced the president toward emancipation.
