led by Samuel Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Richard Henry Lee, favored
vigorous military action against Britain. Most of them foresaw the need of
effective aid from France, which the colonies could obtain only by offering
their commerce. Before that could be done they must become independent
states. Another group, the moderates, represented by Benjamin Harrison and
Robert Morris, hoped that a vigorous prosecution of the war would force
Britain to make a pro-American settlement. Only as a last resort would the
moderates turn to independence. The third group, the conciliationists, led
by John Dickinson, favored defensive measures and looked to "friends of
America" in England to work out a peace that would safeguard American
rights of self-taxation, thereby keeping the colonies in the British
Empire. Washington agreed with the militants and the moderates as to the
need for offensive action. The conciliationists and the moderates, as men
of fortune, trusted him not to use the army to effect an internal
revolution that would strip them of their property and political influence.
Early in the war, Washington and the army had to act as if they were agents
of a full-grown nation. Yet Congress, still in an embryonic state, could
not provide suddenly a body of law covering all the issues that figure in a
major war. Many actions had to be left to Washington's discretion. His
commission (June 17, 1775) stated: "You are hereby vested with full power
and authority to act as you shall think for the good and welfare of the
service." There was a danger that a strong general might use the army to
set up a military dictatorship. It was therefore urgent that the army would
be under a civil authority. Washington agreed with the other leaders that
Congress must be the superior power. Yet the army needed a good measure of
freedom of action. A working arrangement gave such freedom, while
preserving the authority of Congress. If there was no need for haste,
Washington advised that certain steps should be taken, and Congress usually
approved. In emergencies, he acted on his own authority and at once
reported what he had done. If Congress disapproved, he was so informed, and
the action was not repeated. If Congress did nothing, its silence signified
assent. So attentive was Washington to Congress, and so careful was he when
acting on his own initiative, that no serious conflict clouded his
relations with the civil authority.
Washington Takes Command
When he took command of the army at Cambridge on July 3, 1775, the majority
of Congress was reluctant to adopt measures that denoted independence,
although favoring an energetic conduct of the war. The government of Lord
North decided to send an overpowering army to America, and to that end
tried to recruit 20,000 mercenaries in Russia. On August 23, George III
issued the Royal Proclamation of Rebellion, which branded Washington as
guilty of treason and threatend him with "condign punishment." Early in
October, Washington concluded that in order to win the war the colonies
must become independent.
In August 1775, Washington insisted to Gen. Thomas Gage, the British
commander at Boston, that American officers captured by the British should
be treated as prisoners of war--not as criminals (that is, rebels). In
this, Washington asserted that the conflict was a war between two separate
powers and that the Union was on a par with Britain. He defended the rank
of American officers as being drawn from "the uncorrupted choice of a brave
and free people, the purest source and original fountain of all power." In
August-September he initiated an expedition for the conquest of Canada and
invited the king's subjects there to join the 13 colonies in an
"indissoluble union." About the same time he created a navy of six vessels,
which he sent out to capture British ships bringing supplies to Boston.
Congress had not favored authorizing a navy, then deemed to be an arm of an
independent state. Early in November, Washington inaugurated a campaign for
arresting, disarming, and detaining the Tories. Because their leaders were
agents of the British crown, his policy struck at the highest symbol of
Britain's authority. He urged the opening of American ports to French ships
and used his prestige and the strength of the army to encourage leaders of
the provincial governments to adopt measures that committed their colonies
to independence. His influence was evident in the campaigns for
independence in Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York. He contributed as much to the
decision for independence as any man. The Declaration of Independence was
formally adopted on July 4, 1776.
The Military Campaigns
Washington's military record during the revolution is highly creditable.
His first success came on March 17, 1776, when the British evacuated
Boston. He had kept them surrounded and immobilized during a siege of more
than eight months. He had organized a first American army and had recruited
and trained a second. His little fleet had distressed the British by
intercepting their supplies. Lack of powder and cannon long kept him from
attacking. Once they had been procured, he occupied, on March 4-5, 1776, a
strong position on Dorchester Heights, Mass., where he could threaten to
bombard the British camp. The evacuation made him a hero by proving that
the Americans could overcome the British in a major contest. For five
months thereafter the American cause was brightened by the glow of this
outstanding victory--a perilous time when confidence was needed to sustain
morale.
Washington's next major achievement was made in the second half of 1776,
when he avoided a serious defeat and held the army together in the face of
overwhelming odds. In July and August the British invaded southern New York
with 34,000 well-equipped troops. In April, Washington's force had
consisted of only 7,500 effective men. Early in June, Congress had called
19,800 militia for service in Canada and New York. In a few weeks
Washington had to weld a motley throng into a unified force. Even then his
men were outnumbered three to two by the British. Although he suffered a
series of minor defeats (Brooklyn Heights, August 26-29; Kip's Bay,
September 15; Harlem Heights, September 16; White Plains, October 28; Fort
Washington, November 16), the wonder is that he escaped a catastrophe.
After the setbacks in New York, he retreated through New Jersey, crossing
the Delaware River in December. The American cause now sank to its lowest
ebb. Washington's main army, reduced to 3,000 men, seemed about to
disintegrate. It appeared that the British could march easily to
Philadelphia. Congress moved to Baltimore. In these dire straits Washington
made a dramatic move that ended an agonizing campaign in a blaze of glory.
On the stormy night of December 25-26 he recrossed the Delaware, surprised
Britain's Hessian mercenaries at Trenton, and captured 1,000 prisoners.
This move gave him a striking position in central New Jersey, whereupon the
British ceased offensive operations and pulled back to the vicinity of New
York.
On Oct. 17, 1777, Gen. John Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, N. Y., his
army of 5,000 men--all that were left of the 9,500 who had invaded New York
from Canada. To this great victory Washington made two contributions.
First, in September 1775, he sent an expedition to conquer Canada. Although
that aim was not attained, the project put the Americans in control of the
approaches to northern New York, particularly Lake Champlain. Burgoyne
encountered so many obstacles there that his advance was seriously delayed.
That in turn gave time for the militia of New England to turn out in force
and to contribute decisively to his defeat. Second, in 1777, Washington
conducted a campaign near Philadelphia that prevented Gen. William Howe
from using his large army for the relief of Burgoyne. Washington's success
at Trenton had placed him where he could both defend Philadelphia and
strike at British-held New York. Howe had thereupon undertaken a campaign
with the hope of occupying Philadelphia and of crushing Washington's army.
Although Washington suffered minor defeats--at Brandywine Creek on
September 11 and at Germantown on October 4--he again saved his army and,
by engaging Howe in Pennsylvania, made possible the isolation and eventual
defeat of Burgoyne.
Unable to overcome Washington in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the British
shifted their main war effort to the South. In 1781 their invasion of
Virginia enabled Washington to strike a blow that virtually ended the war.
France had joined the United States as a full-fledged ally in February
1778, thereby putting French troops at Washington's disposal and, more
important, giving him the support of a strong navy which he deemed
essential to victory. His plan of 1781 called for an advance from New York
to Virginia of a large American-French army which would act in concert with
the French fleet, to which was assigned the task of controlling Chesapeake
Bay, thereby preventing an escape by sea of the British forces under Lord
Cornwallis. Washington's army trapped Cornwallis at Yorktown, Va., on the
York River, and the French admiral, count de Grasse, gained command of the
bay. Outnumbered, surrounded on land, and cut off by sea, Cornwallis
surrendered his 7,000 troops on October 19. Although Britain still had
large forces in America, the Yorktown blow, along with war weariness
induced by six years of failure, moved the war party in England to resign
in March 1782 in favor of a ministry willing to make peace on the basis of
the independence of the United States.
Political Leadership During the War
Washington's political leadership during the Revolution suggests that of an
active president of later times. He labored constantly to keep people of
