HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
The Politics of Eastern Europe
HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?
By:
Jonas Daniliauskas
Tutor:
T.P. McNeill
March 17, 1995
The Introduction.
The aim of this essay is to answer the question: “How significant was
Alexander Dubcek in the development of reformist communism?” This question
raises the other questions. Was Dubcek the inspirer of all the reforms
which took place in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1969? How much did he himself
influence all the reformist processes? How much he had achieved in
implementing his ideas?
Dubcek became famous only in 1967. Before that he was almost unknown
in the international politics. He was known only in the Czechoslovak
Communist Party (CPCS), where he had almost no influence on the major
decisions (until 1967, of course). His promotion after the returning from
the Moscow where he was studying for three years in the advanced Party
school attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), was quite rapid. In 1960 he was elected to the
Secretariat of the CPCS; in 1962 to the Presidium of the CPCS; in 1963 he
became the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party; finally, on
January 5, 1968 he replaced Antonin Novotny as the First Secretary of the
CPCS. He was the youngest leader of ruling Communist Party (after Fidel
Castro), and the first Slovak in such a high position. Though he stayed in
this post relatively short - until April 17, 1969, when he was replaced by
Gustav Husak, his name became known world-wide.
Why did the reforms begin?
The Czechoslovak crisis deepened in 1967, and showed itself in four
spheres:[1]
1. Slovakia;
2. The economy;
3. The legal system;
4. Party and ideology.
Since the 1962 the Czechoslovak economy suddenly began to show signs
of a critical decline. That happened inevitably, because in the Stalin
years the expansion of heavy industry was pushed at the expense of
development of all other productive sectors of the economy. The result of
this was growing inefficiency of production, failure to modernise
production technology, a decline in the quality of exports, a loss of
markets, and a drop in the effectiveness of foreign trade.[2] In August
1962 the Third-Five-Year Plan had to be abandoned before completion.[3] In
this situation the Slovaks began to act. Many of them realised that
specific Slovak interests might best be served by destalinization and even
liberalisation.[4] The problem also was the rehabilitation of the victims
of the purge trials of 1949-1954. Novotny himself and other leading members
of his regime had personally participated in the preparation and conduct of
the purge trials. So, the rehabilitation was perceived as the direct threat
to the security and the survival of the regime.[5] All these factors only
decreased the level of CPCS’s legitimacy.
The Development of Reforms.
The startpoint of the reforms was the session of the Central
Committee of the CPCS on October 30-31, 1967. Dubcek raised an objection
against Novotny and produced statistics suggesting that Slovakia was being
continuously cheated in economic matters.[6] This speech inspired
discussion what was the unprecedented thing in the Central Committee.
The next session of the Central Committee started on December 19.
Josef Smrkovsky proposed the separation of the posts of President and First
Secretary: “It is unsatisfactory that an excessive number of duties should
be piled upon one pair of shoulders.”[7]
In both sessions the three issues were at stake. First, the
implementation of the economic reforms, secondly, freedom of expression
and, finally, effective autonomy for Slovakia.
Finally, at the Central Committee Plenum on January 5, 1968, Novotny
was replaced at the post of the First Secretary by Dubcek. Also four new
Presidium members were elected to strengthen Dubcek’s position - J.Spacek,
J.Boruvka, E.Rigo, and J.Piller.
So, the Prague Spring started at the top levels of the CPCS. But
soon, as we would see, the Party will loose its ability to control the
developments. At the same time, the hot political debate started in the
press, on radio and television. The main issues were the Communist Party,
democracy, the autonomy of Slovakia, the collapsing economy, and the
problem of justice and legality.[8] On February 14, the first public
political discussion took place in Prague.
The next changes in the leadership were Novotny’s resignation from
the Presidency on March 22 and General Ludvik Svoboda’s election on this
post on March 30, Oldrich Ciernik’s appointment on the post of Prime
Minister and the formation of the new cabinet on April 8, the election of
the new Presidium of the CPCS, and the election of Josef Smrkovsky on the
post of the Chairman of the National Assembly.
On April 9, the CPCS announced its ‘Action Programme’, officially
known as ‘Czechoslovakia’s Road to Socialism’, as a basis for reforming
communism in the country. In this document the CPCS promised: (1) new
guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious observance;
(2) electoral laws to provide a broader choice of candidates, greater
freedom for the four non-communist parties within the National Front; (3)
upgrading of the parliament and the government with regard to the power of
the CPCS apparatus; (4) broad economic reforms to give enterprises greater
independence, to achieve a convertible currency, to revive a limited amount
of private enterprise and to increase trade with Western countries; (5) an
independent judiciary; (6) federal status for Slovakia on an independent
basis and a new constitution to be drafted by the end of 1969.[9] The
Central Committee also pledged a “full and just rehabilitation of all
persons” who had been unjustly persecuted during 1949 -1954.
But this programme promised less than the people actually wanted. The
‘Action Programme’ remained outside the mainstream of the powerful social
process which had been set in motion in January.[10] The people expected
more reforms, more freedom. But Dubcek and other reformats tried to be more
moderate, to find the way for the gradual reforms. The Presidium of the
CPCS prohibited the renovation of the Social Democratic Party and the
Ministry of Interior announced that the formation of political parties
would be considered illegal. But at the same time this Ministry sanctioned
the activity of the Club of Engaged Non-Party Members (KAN), and recognised
the legal statute of another big club - K-231.
Gradually the reformats found themselves in the position which will
become vital for them all. They found themselves between two different
forces. One force was the majority of the Czech and the Slovak nations who
wanted more radical changes. The other force was represented by the
Stalinists, by Moscow, and by the leadership of the other countries of the
Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO).
One of the major reforms was the law of June 26, which abolished
prepublication censorship. On the next day the famous manifesto, entitled
‘2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists and Everyone’
appeared in Literarni listy. The manifesto gave assurances of complete
support of Dubcek’s regime, “if necessary, even with arms.”[11]
The leaders of the SU, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany
viewed the reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia as the threat for all the
Communist Bloc. The first clearly expressed concern was so-called Warsaw
Letter. It was sent on July 15, 1968, and addressed to the Central
Committee of the CPCS. It proved the clear evidence of the WTO leaders’
lack of confidence in the leadership of the CPCS, and contained critical
references to Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy.[12]There was expressed
warning that the Czechoslovak reform policy was ‘completely
unacceptable’.[13]The Presidium of the CPCS Central Committee on July 18
rejected as unfounded the accusations made in the Warsaw Letter and
affirmed that the country’s new policies were aimed at strengthening
socialism.[14]
The clear signs of crisis in relations between Prague and Moscow
appeared. On July 19 Moscow issued a summons to the CPCS Presidium,
demanding that it meet July 22 or 23 with the Soviet Politburo in Moscow,
Kiev or Lvov to discuss internal Czechoslovak developments. 9 full members
of the CPSU Politburo and the entire CPCS Presidium met on July 29 in the
Slovak village Cierna-nad-Tisou. Dubcek and the other reformats regarded
the outcome of the Cierna talks as a ‘Czechoslovak victory’. It had brought
the annulment of the Warsaw Letter; the departure of Soviet troops was
guaranteed, and the country’s sovereignty had been defended.[15]
The fact that the agreement was regarded as the ‘victory’ shows that
Dubcek and the other reformers were really driven by naпvetй and idealism
and hoped that they could create the socialism with the ‘human face’
without the interference from the Moscow side. They really underestimated
their own significance to the Soviets. Moscow regarded the reformats
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