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Will the Internet Be Bad for Democracy?
Eli M. Noam
Professor and Finance and Economics
Director, Columbia Institute for Tele-Information
Graduate School of Business, Columbia University
Presented at the
Heinz Nixdorf Computer Museum Forum
Paderborn, Germany
May 1999
When the media history of the 20th Century will be written, the Internet
will be seen as its major contribution. Television, telephone, and
computers will be viewed as its early precursors, merging and converging
into the new medium just as radio and film did into TV. The Internet’s
impact on culture, business, and politics will be vast, for sure. Where
will it take us? To answer that question is difficult, because the
Internet is not simply a set of interconnecting links and protocols
connecting packet switched networks, but it is also a construct of
imagination, an inkblot test into which everybody projects their desires,
fears and phantasies.
Some see enlightenment and education. Others see pornography and gambling.
Some see sharing and collaboration; others see e-commerce and profits.
Controversies abound on most aspects of the Internet. Yet when it comes to
its impact on democracy process, the answer seems unanimous.[1][1] The
Internet is good for democracy. It creates digital citizens (Wired 1997)
active in the vibrant teledemocracy (Etzioni, 1997) of the Electronic
Republic (Grossman 1995) in the Digital Nation (Katz 1992). Is there no
other side to this question? Is the answer so positively positive?
The reasons why the Internet is supposed to strengthen democracy include
the following.
1. The Internet lowers the entry barriers to political participation.
2. It strengthens political dialogue.
3. It creates community.
4. It cannot be controlled by government.
5. It increases voting participation.
6. It permits closer communication with officials.
7. It spreads democracy world-wide.
Each of the propositions in this utopian populist, view, which might be
called is questionable. But they are firmly held by the Internet founder
generation, by the industry that now operates the medium, by academics from
Negroponte (1995) to Dahl (1989), by gushy news media, and by a cross-party
set of politicians who wish to claim the future, from Gore to Gingrich,
from Bangemann to Blair.
I will argue, in contrast, that the Internet, far from helping democracy,
is a threat to it. And I am taking this view as an enthusiast, not a
critic. But precisely because the Internet is powerful and revolutionary,
it also affects, and even destroys, all traditional institutions--including-
-democracy. To deny this potential is to invite a backlash when the
ignored problems eventually emerge.[2][2]
My perspective is different from the neo-Marxist arguments about big
business controlling everything; from neo-Luddite views that low-tech is
beautiful; and from reformist fears that a politically disenfranchised
digital underclass will emerge. The latter, in particular, has been a
frequent perspective. Yet, the good news is that the present income-based
gap in Internet usage will decline in developed societies. Processing and
transmission becomes cheap, and will be anywhere, affordably. Transmission
will be cheap, and connect us to anywhere, affordably. And basic equipment
will almost be given away in return for long-term contracts and advertising
exposure.
That is why what we now call basic Internet connectivity will not be a
problem. Internet connectivity will be near 100% of the households and
offices, like electricity, because the Internet will have been liberated
from the terror of the PC as its gateway, the most consumer-unfriendly
consumer product ever built since the unicycle.
Already, more than half of communications traffic is data rather than
voice, which means that it involves fast machines rather than slow people.
These machines will be everywhere. Cars will be chatting with highways.
Suitcases will complain to airlines. Electronic books will download from
publishers. Front doors will check in with police departments. Pacemakers
will talk to hospitals. Television sets will connect to video servers.
For that reason, my skepticism about the Internet as a pro-democracy force
is not based on its uneven distribution. It is more systemic. The problem
is that most analysts commit a so-called error of composition. That is,
they confuse micro behavior with macro results. They think that if
something is helpful to an individual, it is also helpful to society at
large, when everybody uses it.
Suppose we would have asked, a century ago, whether the automobile would
reduce pollution. The answer would have been easy and positive: no horses,
no waste on the roads, no smell, no use of agricultural land to grow oats.
But we now recognize that in the aggregate, mass motorization has been bad
for the environment. It created emissions, dispersed the population, and
put more demand on land.
The second error is that of inference. Just because the Internet is good
for democracy in places like North Korea, Iran, or Sudan does not mean that
it is better for Germany, Denmark, or the United States. Just because
three TV channels offer more diversity of information than one does not
mean that 30,000 are better than 300.
So here are several reasons why the Internet will not be good for
democracy, corresponding to the pro-democracy arguments described above.
. The Internet Will Make Politics More Expensive and Raise Entry
Barriers
The hope has been that online public space will be an electronic version of
a New England or Swiss town meeting, open and ongoing. The Internet would
permit easy and cheap political participation and political campaigns. But
is that true?
Easy entry exists indeed for an Internet based on narrowband transmission,
which is largely text-based. But the emerging broadband Internet will
permit fancy video and multimedia messages and information resources.
Inevitably, audience expectations will rise. When everyone can speak, who
will be listened to? If the history of mass media means anything, it will
not be everyone. It cannot be everyone. Nor will the wisest or those with
the most compelling case or cause be heard, but the best produced, the
slickest, and the best promoted. And that is expensive.
Secondly, because of the increasing glut and clutter of information, those
with messages will have to devise strategies to draw attention. Political
attention, just like commercial one, will have to be created. Ideology,
self-interest, and public spirit are some factors. But in many cases,
attention needs to be bought, by providing entertainment, gifts, games,
lotteries, coupons, etc, That, too, is expensive. The basic cost of
information is rarely the problem in politics; it’s the packaging. It is
not difficult or expensive to produce and distribute handbills or to make
phone calls, or to speak at public events. But it is costly to communicate
to vast audiences in an effective way, because that requires large
advertising and PR budgets.
Thirdly, effective politics on the Internet will require elaborate and
costly data collection. The reason is that Internet media operate
differently from traditional mass media. They will not broadcast to all
but instead to specifically targeted individuals. Instead of the broad
stroke of political TV messages, “netcasted” politics will be customized to
be most effective. This requires extensive information about individuals’
interests and preferences. Data banks then become a key to political
effectiveness. Who would own and operate them? In some cases the
political parties. But they could not maintain control over the data banks
where a primary exist that is open to many candidates. There is also a
privacy problem, when semi-official political parties store information
about the views, fears, and habits of millions of individuals. For both of
those reasons the ability of parties to collect such data will be limited.
Other political data banks will be operated by advocacy and interest
groups. They would then donate to candidate’s data instead of money. The
importance of such data banks would further weaken campaign finance laws
and further strengthen interest group pluralism over traditional political
parties.
But in particular, political data banks will maintained through what is now
known as political consultants. They will establish permanent and
proprietary permanent data banks and become still bigger players in the
political environment and operate increasingly as ideology-free for –profit
consultancies.
Even if the use of the Internet makes some political activity cheaper, it
does so for everyone, which means that all organization will increase their
activities rather than spend less on them.[3][1] If some aspects of
campaigning become cheaper, they would not usually spend less, but instead
do more.
Thus, any effectiveness of early adopters will soon be matched by their
rivals and will simply lead to an accelerated, expensive, and mutually
